Sandy Linhart

Clever v. Cherry Hill Township (1993)

Case Brief

Citation: Clever v. Cherry Hill Township

Topic: Holiday Celebrations in Public Schools

Relief Sought: Taxpayers and parents objected to use of religious symbols in Christmas celebrations. They would like them to be removed.

Issue: 1. Can schools display religious symbols on school calendars marking special religious holidays? 2. Can schools use religious symbols in Christmas displays in classrooms or central areas of the school? Can schools incorporate religious themes in educational programs?

Facts: Taxpayers and parents in Cherry Hill, New Jersey challenged the policies of the Cherry Hill Board of Education which regulated the use of ‘cultural, ethnic and religious themes in school programs. The school used religious symbols in Christmas programs, Christmas displays and in classroom activities and displays. The plaintiffs wanted the use of religious symbols to be banned in the school. The case went to the New Jersey District Court and on December 2, 1993, the decision was in favor of the Cherry Hill Township School District.

Finding of the Court:For the Cherry Hill Township School District.

Reasoning: The court ruled that religion is an acceptable subject of study in schools and that the use of religious symbols to teach about religion must be treated as normal and constitutional activity – including on the occasion of religious holidays. According to Judge Joseph Irenas:

“Religion is a pervasive and enduring human phenomenon which is an appropriate, if not desirable, subject of secular study. It is hard to imagine how such study can be undertaken without exposing students to the religious doctrines and symbols of others. Plaintiffs protest that the calendars and central displays are not part of a ‘planned program of instruction’, but the use of appropriate classroom and central displays is clearly a recognized and legitimate educational technique.”

The judge underscored the importance of studying different religious traditions in a nation as culturally diverse as the United States. He also pointed out that there were a number of important factors which caused the use of religious symbols to be permissible; they occurred in a generally secular context, the displays were only erected for a short period of time, they were passive (no students were expected to participate in anything religious), and there was an absence of any preference for any particular denomination.

This decision clearly allows for public schools to include specifically religious aspects to the observance of or teaching about religious holidays.

Barb Pline

Citation: Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)

Engel Et Al. v. Vitale Et Al.

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New York, No. 468

Topic: Prayer in public schools

Relief Sought: Government directed prayer is unconstitutional under the Establishment

Clause of the First Amendment.

Issue(s): (1) Is government directed non-denominational prayer unconstitutional? (2)

Would it still be unconstitutional if the student were not required to participate?

Facts: State officials wrote the official prayer and schools were required to recite it

During opening exercises. Parents of 10 students believed prayer each morning to

the “Almighty God” was against their religious beliefs and a violation of the

Establishment Clause. The prayer is:

Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee,

and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers,

and our country, Amen.

Finding of the Trial Court: For School District

Finding of the Appellate Court: Court of Appeals of New York reversed and remanded

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reasoning: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”

There is no doubt that reciting a prayer prior to instruction in a school is a religious activity. A government should have no part in composing or requiring a prayer be recited, as deemed by the separation of church and state. Historically, this is one of the reasons people chose to settle in America, to get away from government imposed religion. The fact that the prayer is non-denominational does not suffice. Any union between church and state will be destined to alienate some being. Not to say that religion and religious beliefs are not an important part of history. Acts of religion are to be conducted in areas other than government controlled places. Student’s choice to participate in a government directed prayer is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Dan Beck

BRIEF on FFRF v. Rhea County Board of Education

Citation: FFRF v. Rhea County Board of Education; No. 1:01-cv-115 (Tn. 2002)

Topic: Religion in a public school

Relief Sought: School officials may not grant religious speakers preferential access to public audiences.

Issue(s): (1) Is teaching Bible classes in a public school unconstitutional? (2) Is it still unconstitutional if students are not required to participate?

Facts: Plaintiffs, John Doe, Mary Doe, and their family, representing the Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF), brought action against Sue Porter, Superintendent, and the Rhea County Board of Education , alleging that government teaching of Bible classes in a public school is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. For many years the school board of Rhea County, Tennessee had allowed a program named “Bible Education Ministry” (BEM) to take place in their public schools. The BEM program involves Bible lessons being taught to kindergarten through fifth grades for thirty minutes per week. There was no written description of the program, no public oversight, and no attempt to obtain parental consent for student participation. Furthermore, school officials did not personally operate the program. Instead, it was operated by students from nearby Bryan College, under the direction of Dr. Travis Henry Ricketts, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of History and Director of Practical Christian Involvement. (Bryan College was established in honor of William Jennings Bryan, who in the 1920’s expressed his desire for a school in Dayton, Tennessee, the Rhea County Seat, to teach the truth from a biblical perspective.) The only argument the defense made in this case was that participation in the program was voluntary for the students.

Finding of the Trial Court: For the plaintiffs.

Finding of the Appellate Court: Court of appeals affirmed the court below.

Reasoning: In determining this case, Judge R. Allan Edgar used the Supreme Court’s “Lemon Test” to examine the validity of the Bible lessons. According to the Lemon Test, a valid law must: (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have the primary effect of neither advancing nor inhibiting religion; and (3) not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion. The BEM program failed in all three points of the test. There was no secular purpose in teaching the Bible as “truth” rather than simply as a historical document. The primary effect of teaching one particular vision of religion, Christianity and the Bible, definitely had the effect of advancing that particular religious perspective. Finally, there was excessive entanglement of religion and government because government favored one particular religious sect. Also, as far as the voluntary participation issue, it was discovered that the students were never told by anyone that they could “opt out” of the program. Judge Edgar’s decision stated this was not even a “close case,” citing the 1948 Supreme Court McCollum v. Board of Education decision. That decision stated it was unconstitutional for “the State to use its public school system to aid any or all religious faiths or sects in the dissemination of their doctrines.” FFRF v. Rhea County was so one-sided in the level of proof against the defendants that a “summary judgment” was obtained. A summary judgment is a procedural mechanism by which one party seeks to win the case without having to go to trial, and is only available if the facts that are important to the court’s decision are not in dispute.

Taunya Mcgee

Citation: McCollum v. Board of Education Dist. 71, 333 U.S. 203 (1948)

Topic: Religious Establishment

Relief Sought: Plaintiff, Mrs. Vashti McCollum, brought action to cease religious instruction within public school system.

Issue(s): Does teaching religious classes within a public school system violate the First Amendment Establishment Clause?

Facts: Members of three faiths (Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Protestant) formed a group called the Champaign Council on Religious Education. This was a voluntary group that provided classes in religious education to public school students from grades four to nine. The classes occurred within the school building, during the school day, and required parent permission to participate. Those students who did not wish to participate were sent to another location of the school for secular education. McCollum, a resident and taxpayer, was an atheist mother who disagreed with this procedure and believed that the practice violated the separation of church and state, and her First Amendment rights. She sued for writ of mandamus, thus wanting the school board to cease this practice.

Finding of the Trial Court: For defendant school district

Finding of the Appellate Court: State Supreme court affirmed the court below.

Finding of the U.S. Supreme Court: For plaintiff McCollum.

Reasoning: In a 6-1 decision, the Supreme Court found this practice unconstitutional. Use of a public school building, which is tax supported, for education in religious instruction does violate the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. "This is beyond all questions a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith” (Find Law, n.d.). This close cooperation between the school officials and religious leaders does violate the Establishment Clause. Students are required to attend school according to the compulsory school attendance law. When students are allowed to attend religious classes taught by the voluntary group, the students were not following the legal requirement for attendance. The school was in violation of assisting the religious community spread the faith through “released time”. In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, a wall was erected to create separation between church and state. This wall was violated by the Champaign school district when religious instruction occurred during the regular school attendance day.

Patrick Green

Citation: Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)

Topic: Student led, student initiated prayer at a football game

Relief Sought: Two sets of Parents brought suit against the school district in an action to

stop the student led prayers before sporting events (football game).

Facts: Two sets of students and their parents (who remained anonymous to protect them from harassment so they were referred to as Does) one

Catholic and one Mormon, objected to the practice of student led prayers

before football games. These parents filed suit against the school on the

basis of a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

While the suit was pending the Santa Fe school district adopted a new

policy in which students would vote to decide if they wanted the prayers

to be said at the games and a second vote to determine the prayer leader(s). The students voted to continue with the prayers and selected a spokesperson to give the invocation. After the the district court ordered a modification to the policy stating the prayers could be recited but only if they were nonsectarian and nonproselytizing.

Finding of the Trial Court: For the school district as long as it added the modification as

above mentioned.

Finding of the Appellate Court: Appellate Court reversed the decision saying that even

as modified by the District Court the football prayer policy was invalid.

Finding of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court upheld the Appellate Court’s decision.

ReasoningIn a 6-3 opinion the court felt that the school district’s policy

to allow student initiated prayer before football games violates the

Establishment Clause. The majority opinion was written by Justice

Stevens who relied heavily on the verdict from Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.

577. In the Lee case it was established that school initiated prayer

(i.e. prayer at graduation ceremony) infringed on the right of separation

between church and state. Justice Stevens concluded that since the school

initiated and conducted the school election it still was a school

sponsored activity. Furthermore, due to the school sponsored football prayer being authorized by a school official, taking place on school property, and pursuant to a school policy that explicitly encourages public prayer, this prayer could not justifiably be considered private. The court also rejected the argument that the policy was different from Lee case because it did not coerce students to participate in religious observances. Finally the court concluded that the Establishment Clause was derived to alleviate any question or debate over this specific type of issue dealing with governmental supervision and/or control.

Pat Versluis

Citation: School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania, et al. v. Schempp et al.,374 U.S. 203 (1963)

Topic: Reading religious material in public schools

Relief Sought: Edward Schempp filed suit against the Abington Township School Dist. In federal court to prohibit enforcement of a Pennsylvania state law that required his children to hear and sometimes read portions of the Bible as part of their public education.

Issue(s): (1)Does the state of Pennsylvania have the right to require students to read and listen to Bible readings in public school? (2)Can and should the parent remove the child during the school day when the readings were taking place?

Facts: The law 24 Pa. Stat 15-1516, as amended, Pub. Law 1928 required that at least ten verses from the Holy Bible be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day. Mr. Schempp filed this suit on behalf of his daughter Ellery. He specifically contended that the statute violated his and his family’s rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Many families didn’t like the idea of having their children exposed to the Bible readings but didn’t go to the extent as Mr. Schempp did. Four other states had statutes requiring readings in mornings before class. Twenty-five states had laws allowing “optional” Bible reading, with the other states having no laws supporting or rejecting Bible reading. In eleven of those states with laws supportive of Bible reading or state-sponsored prayer, courts had declared them unconstitutional.

Finding of the District Court #1: In favor of the respondent Mr. Schempp

Finding of the District Court #2: In favor of the respondent Mr. Schempp

Finding of US Supreme Court: 8 to 1 in favor of Edward Schempp and declared sanctioned organized Bible reading in public schools in the United States to be unconstitutional.

Reasoning: The reading of verses, even without comment, possesses a devotional and religious character and constitutes in effect a religious observance. Justice Clark stated that the Court was of the feeling that no matter the religious nature of the citizenry, the government at all levels, as required by the Constitution, must remain neutral in matters of religion while protecting all, preferring none, and disparaging none. He continued that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. Neither can constitutionally pass laws nor impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs. Justice Brennan cited the lack of appreciation of the plurality or religious thought as the basic flaw of the Pennsylvania’s Bible reading statute and Abington Township’s defense of it. Justice Brennan also took great pains to also show that many states, such as South Dakota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Massachusetts had already enacted and revoked laws similar to Pennsylvania’s by the first half of the twentieth century.